The German-Polish Situation up to the Outbreak of War

Europe was relieved to hear of the German-Polish agreement on Jan. 26, 1934. The realistic peace determination of Adolf Hitler, together with the true sense of statesmanship of Marshal Pilsudski, had found common ground in the mutual desire to establish a new state of political relationship by direct contact between Germany and Poland, the basic idea being to ensure the maintenance and security of a lasting peace between the two countries. It was realised by all those who saw in the latent tension between Germany and Poland an immediate danger to the peace of Europe that such a constructive cooperation of the two statesmen must be of interest to the whole of Europe. It was the most earnest desire of Germany and Poland to follow up the first declaration of a 10-years pact by the development of sincere friendly relations. Such a friendship based on peaceful development would have left the door open for a friendly and acceptable settlement of all outstanding questions between the two neighbouring countries. There was no doubt that problems, as yet unsettled, did exist between the two countries. It was quite clear that the conditions and boundaries imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles were for any length of time impossible and unacceptable. It depended on the honesty of purpose of Poland as to how far an arrangement of a closer understanding between the two countries could fulfil the sincere hopes of Germany and all peace-loving friends.

At that time already, certain definite forces abroad were actively trying to disturb the work of conciliation between Germany and Poland. The opponents of the Third Reich were not in the least interested in a relaxation of the tension between Germany and Poland; in fact they were secretly and openly fanning the ever-glowing fires of propaganda in Poland and directed against Germany and everything German. The change of course in policy both in Berlin and Warsaw in no way suited their plans. Apart from this, a reconciliation of Poland with her neighbour did not represent the aims of the supporters of the Treaty of Versailles, who intended that Poland should remain in a state of permanent opposition to Germany, and that she should remain as an active instrument in the encirclement policy against the Reich. As a result the enemies of friendly advances between Germany and Poland tried to stifle from the very beginning any reasonable political arrangement and any attempt at a reconciliation between Germany and Poland, by resuscitating the old differences and suspicions. With the help of extremist Polish societies and the Press, already controlled by Jewish elements, the saboteurs of conciliatory measures very soon gained the upper-hand. The intensified campaign of anti-German propaganda had an increasing influence on public opinion and incited it against Germany and the German minority in Poland. The anti-German activity found ready response amongst Polish officials and military circles. The continued efforts of the Government of the Reich, with a view to persuading those in Warsaw responsible for the creation of public opinion to act in accord with the German-Polish Press agreement of Feb. 24, 1934, and to arrive at an effective moral disarmament within the spirit and general lines of the agreement of understanding remained unsuccessful.

Since the days of Versailles, the political situation between Germany and Poland had never calmed down. On the contrary the systematic deprival of the right of the German element long established in former Prussian provinces remained such a dead weight on German-Polish relations that the greater part of the world's opinion was always sceptical of the success of the German-Polish agreement of understanding. In German opinion the strong personality of Pilsudski offered in itself guarantee enough that, in the development of the idea of an understanding, an alteration in sentiment would take place, together with a change in the hostile attitude of wide circles of influence in Poland against German minority groups. The Führer held the firm opinion that, in spite of all obstructive circumstances, the German-Polish work of cooperation must be attempted and developed until the desired results had been attained. He held that despite the disappointment of the German Government caused by the unscrupulous Polish methods within the sphere of minority policy, as well as by the continuous anti-German press campaign, these must not be allowed to interfere with his hopes for the success of the final issue.

Even during Pilsudski's lifetime it had been clearly shown that the authority of the Marshal himself was not sufficient to make the subordinate Polish officials adhere to a just treatment of the German minority. The exaggerated Polish patriotic feeling still appeared in a more moderate way, but it had not been eliminated. For the time being suppressive measures were not so brutal, but more cunning. The political system based on the old watchword of sworn principle to exterminate everything of German origin, continued unhampered; full responsibility for this must be ascribed to the Polish Government. After the death of Marshal Pilsudski the mask was completely dropped. A campaign of aggressive activity, based on the desire for annexation and such aims was very soon developed in speech and in print.

The continuous efforts of Germany to bring about tolerable relations between the German minority and the Polish population were of no avail. Her efforts were completely frustrated by the sterile attitude of the Polish Government. Poland's absolutely negative attitude, marked by an unbroken chain of violations of the spirit of the German-Polish pact, and also by a continual breach of the fundamental principles governing the protection of minorities, agreed to and signed by Poland in the reciprocal minority agreement of Nov. 5, 1937 became manifestly clear when the respective representatives of the central administrative offices of both countries met in Berlin on Feb. 27, 1939, to discuss all outstanding questions, pertaining to minorities. These unsuccessful discussions showed that Poland had no intentions of carrying on Marshal Pilsudski's clearly defined policy of peace and harmony with his German neighbour. The specific desire of the Führer for a definite settlement of the Danzig question, and that of a territorial link between East Prussia and the Reich were repeatedly placed before the Polish Government in the friendliest manner. The evasive attitude, however, of Colonel Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs, made it clearer from month to month that the Polish authorities were methodically turning their backs on any intention of agreement [15] with Germany. Poland's increased resistance to any kind of reparation or even alleviation of the injustice of Versailles as regards Germany's Eastern boundary, corresponded with the stiffening of the Polish policy towards the members of the German minority and with an intensified Chauvinistic activity of the Polish press, tantamount to a direct challenge to the Reich.

Even in the spring of 1939 it became quite clear that the change in Poland's foreign policy was being definitely advanced and guided by two forces. Polish public opinion, influenced by the Government's toleration of anti-German propaganda, was imbued with an unparalleled feeling of hatred against everything German. Any statement or expression pertaining to the daily life of the German minority was considered as an hostile act against the Polish State and in consequence the extermination of everything of German origin was put forward as a national duty. It was evident that the restraint of the German Government towards this degeneration of hatred towards minority Germans was regarded by the Polish authorities as an expression of weakness. This fateful error was the underlying motive for the vehement attacks on Germany which expressed themselves in impassioned demands for the annexation of German territory, and reached their climax in the ridiculous display of megalomania, as displayed in a demand for the River Elbe as a boundary necessary to Polish national requirements. The Polish Government gave a free hand to the perpetrators of such bellicose demonstration of annexation, as well as to the miscreants of acts of violence against the German minority in the Western provinces, who were in their turn aided and abetted by the provincial authorities. The responsibility for this feverish atmosphere was hereby placed on the shoulders of the Polish Government. This finally resulted in moral chaos in towns and in the country, accompanied by indiscriminate murders of thousands of defenceless and innocent minority Germans by Polish soldiers and armed civilians.

The question arose as to how the Polish Government could allow such a dangerous sentiment to develop in the country and to such an extent as to permit her own citizens of German origin to be surrendered to the lowest class of Polish degenerates, whose very lust for murder made them ignore constitution, law, morality and humaneness. Furthermore how could responsible Polish rulers allow themselves to be manoeuvred deeper and deeper into a condition of irreparable tension with Germany, without accounting to State or people for the inevitable consequences of an armed conflict with Germany? The answer to this leads to the second force which influenced Poland from outside and allowed Poland to believe that all further consideration towards the German minority or the Reich could be dropped. This force was England, was the guarantee of assistance given by the British Government to Poland, and the British active influence to use Poland as a pawn to stimulate the British encirclement policy so thoroughly as to kindle the fires of war – a war which had been prepared long beforehand, and was intentional, and which actually broke out in connection with Danzig and the Corridor. As England was guaranteeing this diabolical scheme, Warsaw was of the opinion that no moderation or consideration of action as to avoiding overdoing anything was necessary. England had guaranteed the integrity of Poland! The British promise of assistance to Poland had provided the latter with the role of a political battering ram. Since then, and conscious of this, Poland had permitted herself to challenge the Reich in every conceivable way and, in her delusions, even dreamt of a "victorious battle before the gates of Berlin." Had the British war clique not continually urged Poland into an obstinate resistance towards the Reich, and had it not been for Britain's promises, of which she felt perfectly sure, it is very doubtful whether Poland would ever have allowed things to go so far, as to make the signal for the removal of Germans in the eyes of Polish military and civilians equivalent to a signal for the murder and bestial butchery of German people.¹ Without the blank cheque given by Great Britain to Poland the latter would never have so frivolously rejected the unique offer for compromise made by the Führer, as was made public in his speech in the Reichstag on April 28, 1939, or would Poland ever have started her war machinery or opened the doors to the Provincial governors' policy of extermination of the German minority. The German minority in Poland had long since been gagged and deprived of all rights.² Thousands of German enterprises and independent German businesses had been systematically destroyed by cancellation of orders, boycott, by taxes rigorously calculated and even more vigorously applied, withdrawal of concessions, confiscation, and the refusal of permits for the purchase of land. Innumerable German workmen and employees, for the greater part old and trusted hands, were made victims of mass dismissals, based on political race discrimination, and were driven from their normal areas of work and reduced to a condition of absolute penury with no further means of existence. The one-sided application of the Agrarian Reform Laws and the regulations governing frontier zones forced old established German settlers to emigrate. German church services were disturbed, German newspapers were seized one after the other; and the use of the German language was made impossible either in the street, in shops or restaurants. Germans were attacked in the open country, in their homes and on their farms. From May 1939 onwards prohibition orders and punishments literally hailed down upon them. The closing down of schools, kindergartens, libraries and German clubs, the elimination of cooperatives, cultural and charitable societies, and the personal threat to each individual, increased to an unimaginable degree, quite contrary to the rights of the German minority as guaranteed by the Constitution.

²The terrific losses caused to German interests in Poland during the Polish domination can be given in figures under the heading of emigration, expropriation, closing of German schools, as follows: up to the middle of 1939, 1.4 million Germans under the pressure of Polish officials had emigrated from Posen–West Prussia and from Upper Silesia. German settlers had lost 1,263,288 acres of land and of these 265,288 acres due to the one-sided Agrarian Reforms unilaterally applied against Germans, 998,000 acres due to cancellation and liquidation. Of the 657 public German minority schools in existence in 1925 (in 1927 only 498), only 185 were left at the beginning of the school year 1938/1939 (of these 150 in Posen–West Prussia and 35 in Upper Silesia). ...back...

The Polish Atrocities
Against the German Minority in Poland.
Edited and published by order of the Foreign Office
and based upon documentary evidence.
Compiled by Hans Schadewaldt.